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ABSTRACT: The paper investigates the prospect of dealing 
with “immediate experience” from a pragmatist 
perspective. The issue at stake is the possibility of 
speaking in a deflationary yet tenable way about the 
direct character of our common experiences of the 
world, given that the human environment is profoundly 
characterized by linguistic, inferential and interpretative 
practices.  
The author explores John Dewey’s answers to the 
above-mentioned problem. These can be seen to reflect 
a sort of tension within classic pragmatism between the 
young Peirce's lesson about the semiotic and mediated 
structure of human cognition and James’s mature claim 
for immediate experience.  
Not least by means of a comparison with 
Wittgenstein’s approach, the thesis arising from the 
paper is that Dewey was able to solve the apparent 
divergence by considering experience in close 
connection with life and through a complementary 
understanding of cognition as a specific form of 
experience, as well as by emphasizing the role of the 
qualitative or aesthetic aspect of primary experience. 
Moreover, Dewey’s non-foundational and circular 
conception of the relationships between qualitative and 
reflective experience is identified as a decisive step. 
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Is there any room for immediate experience in the human 
world, namely a world that is profoundly characterized by 
linguistic, inferential and interpretative practices, by 
complex forms of communication and signification, as well 
as by normative issues? Can we still speak in a deflationary 
yet tenable way about the direct character of our common 
experiences of the world after the crucial philosophical 
turns that took place in the previous century – the semiotic 
turn, the hermeneutic turn and the linguistic one? 
It should clearly be stated that this question is not to be 
interpreted as a kind of epistemological problem referring 
to the enduring issue in modern and contemporary 
philosophy of whether and how it is possible to anchor our 
knowledge of allegedly external reality in stable ground. The 
classical pragmatists as well as the later Wittgenstein – not 
to speak of Heidegger’s Being and Time and Merleau-
Ponty’s “Introduction” to his Phenomenology of Perception 
– clearly acknowledged that the world we belong to and 
interact with is already there before we begin any 
epistemological inquiry (see Colapietro’s paper in the 
current issue of this journal). Nonetheless, I fear we run the 
risk of throwing out the baby with the bathwater, if we do 
not consider the ways in which the world has a direct or 
immediate impact on us, on our lives, notwithstanding the 
linguistic, largely interpretative, inferential and mediated 
character of our practices. 
I think that John Dewey provided a positive answer to 
this question. Hence, we should try to investigate how and 
to what extent there is room in his conception of 
experience for forms of immediate interaction between 
human organisms and their environment, given that he 
assumed that our environment is naturally social and 
culturally configured – in other words, that the human 
world is naturally characterized by intelligent, broadly 
linguistic
1
 and normative practices. 
In the context of the pragmatist tradition, Dewey fully 
accepted Peirce's lesson about the semiotic and mediated 
structure of human cognition. Nonetheless, he perceived 
the claim for immediate experience supported by James in 
his Essays in Radical Empiricism as genuine or legitimate. In 
these papers, William James had freed himself from the 
picture of the individual conscience as something 
characterized by "absolute insularity" and privateness. 
Nonetheless, James had felt the need to give an account of 
the vague and overabundant complexity of life against the 
over-intellectualization of philosophical problems. 
Consequently, he had made a strong case for recognizing 
direct, non-inferential forms of human experience (Gavin 
1992). 
 
                                                 
1
 By “broadly linguistic” I mean properly verbal practices 
as well as what Joseph Margolis calls “lingual” acts and 
behaviours, namely activities that are significant in 
connection to shared forms of life and culture, and 
which depend on the mastering of a common language. 
See Margolis 2017. 
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Dewey was caught between the two – the early 
Peirce on the one hand and the mature James on the 
other one – and, in my opinion, he tried to find a way 
out, even though he did not explicitly pose the problem 
as arising from the two fathers of pragmatism. His 
solution is partly grounded in his conception of human 
behavior as largely based on habits, understood in 
almost physiological and pre-personal terms, and not 
primarily as the result of the repetition of a voluntary or 
conscious action (Dewey 1983). However, I will not 
explore this route in the present paper, because I have 
dealt with it elsewhere (Dreon 2016). Differently, I will 
suggest that an answer to the present question can be 
found by considering Dewey’s conception of experience 
as a primarily living process that is broader and more 
inclusive than knowledge – complementarily, cognition is 
interpreted as an internal phase and extension of 
primarily qualitative, aesthetic or affective experience. 
On the other hand, Dewey’s solution – or dissolution – of 
the problem at stake is connected with an explicit 
acknowledgment of the fact that the relationships 
between reflective inquiries and eminently qualitative 
phases of experience are circular and non-hierarchical, 
because the results of previous inferences and inquiries 
have loop effects on our primarily qualitative everyday 
experience and reshape it. 
This whole problem, as far as I understand it, is not 
at all foreign to the Wittgenstein of the second part of 
the Philosophical Investigations. Although Wittgenstein's 
efforts here are mainly directed at denying or at least 
questioning the possibility of an Erlebnis – namely, an 
interior and immediately lived experience assumed as a 
kind of privileged source of certainty – his path seems to 
be more tortuous, insofar as he obliquely tries to 
consider the often direct character of our practices. I 
think that Wittgenstein gave an affirmative answer to 
the above-mentioned question, but his response only 
partially coincides with the solutions that Dewey offers 
us if we approach his texts in the way I am suggesting 
here. 
Consequently, I will begin my inquiry by focusing on 
Peirce’s criticism of introspection and of any assumed 
primacy of unmediated experience in his so-called anti-
Cartesian essays. Then I will consider some similarities 
with Wittgenstein’s criticism of Erlebnis as a privileged 
internal experience, allegedly immune from doubt. I will 
also sketch out an alternative path leading to different 
ways of seeing experience as unmediated by 
interpretations in the second part of his Philosophical 
Investigations. After this Wittgensteinian excursus, I will 
explore James’s claim in favor of pure experience in his 
Essays in Radical Empiricism – where he does not 
relinquish the notion of immediate experience, but 
definitely rejects any previous dualistic hesitations. The 
last section will focus on Dewey’s answers to the whole 
issue, by following his main lines of thought, as briefly 
outlined above. 
 
1. Peirce on the Pervasiveness of Mediation 
 
As a point of departure, I will consider the very strong 
criticism formulated by the young Peirce of the 
privileged role traditionally attributed to first-hand 
experience, which is usually characterized as being 
immediate and intuitively certain, and hence as 
deserving an epistemological primacy over other types 
of indirect, mediated and discursive cognition. The main 
reference is, of course, to Peirce’s anti-Cartesian essays, 
published in 1868, Some Consequences of Four 
Incapacities and Questions Concerning Certain Faculties 
Claimed for Man. In these papers, we can find a negative 
answer to the question I posed at the beginning: very 
briefly, there is no room for immediate experience in a 
world like the human one, which precludes the 
possibility of thinking without signs. More properly, we 
should acknowledge that for Peirce both a specific 
thought, produced at a certain moment, and a specific 
feeling arising out of a particular context in a more or 
less idiosyncratic manner are unique and sui generis 
events that simply happen without any mediation. 
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However, in order for both of them to signify something 
for speakers of the same language or for a limited group 
of individuals involved in a situation (5.289), they must 
be based on the implicit or explicit institution of a 
mediating relationship, which is to say on a complete or 
incomplete inference, on a unifying hypothesis that can 
be more or less anchored in plausible reasons. There is 
neither any immediate self-awareness nor any special 
faculty of introspection of the internal world 
independent of our knowledge of the external world 
(5.244), to which we should attribute a privileged 
certainty in comparison with our mediated knowledge of 
the external world. 
The polemical objective is twofold: first, Peirce tells 
us (against Descartes’s assumption) that self-knowledge 
and introspection are not immediate, direct experiences, 
but are the result of complex inferential processes (1). 
More specifically, Peirce states that the feeling of the 
self in the young child is the result of a network of 
processes involving bodily, social and linguistic practices 
(5.226). For him, the feeling of one’s own self is the 
result of the perception that one’s own body is more 
centrally basic (in terms of the management of one’s 
own space) than other people’s bodies, as well as the 
product of a gradual learning of language by which the 
baby is exposed, step-by-step, to the testimony of others 
about a specific state of facts as convergent or divergent 
from its own. In this way, the young creature would be 
driven to use the first-person pronoun in order to posit a 
seat of ignorance or divergence.
2
 
Secondly, Peirce extends his claim to the point of 
denying that immediate forms of cognition – and 
perhaps of experience – exist at all (2). Peirce states that 
even the perception of two-dimensional and three-
                                                 
2 
As is well known, Mead supported the idea that self-
identity emerges out of the capacity to take the role of 
the other in a conversation of gestures. However, I agree 
with Cook (in Cook 1993: 78 and ff.) that Mead did not 
conceived this process as basically involving any kind of 
interpretation or inference but rather as a kind of 
affectively based tuning (see also Dreon forthcoming). 
dimensional spaces, as well as sound and tactile 
perceptions, rest on comparisons, abstractions, 
selections, and reductions to more or less reasonable 
units as well as on predictions about features that are 
not actually present in perception. According to a 
semiotic approach, perception should be considered to 
be a mediated process, based on implicit inferences or 
interpretations (Paolucci 2016, 29). 
Peirce is here disputing the associationist claim that 
mere perceptive data are the basic ingredients of 
cognitive processes. He is arguing therefore that these 
data cannot be considered privileged cognitive resources 
for laying the foundations of the cognitive building, as 
suggested by classical empiricism. Nevertheless, we 
should note that in these essays Peirce is still thinking of 
perception in eminently cognitive terms, as one of the 
components of a structurally inferential cognitive 
process. 
More radically, he seems to adopt the same 
approach even with regard to emotions and habits, i.e. 
forms of affective and practical experience beyond 
reasoning in the strict sense. As a matter of fact, in this 
essay, Peirce argues that both emotions and habits 
involve inferential processes. 
He tells us that an emotion is a simple predicate that 
replaces a series of different predicates by unifying them 
on the basis of an implicit (and often risky) hypothesis – 
a form of inference that is not grounded on rational 
explanations, as in the case of inferential judgments 
(5.292). Moreover, for Peirce emotions differ from 
intellectual judgments not because of their alleged 
immediacy, but because of their close connection with 
the idiosyncratic circumstances and the particular 
dispositions of a specific individual, as happens with the 
sense of beauty and morality (5.247). Differently, 
intellectual judgments would be more generally related 
to human nature, the human mind or the human 
community. 
On the other hand, Peirce tells us that a habit is a 
form of practical inference which is constituted “when, 
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having had the sensation of performing a certain act, m, 
on several occasions a, b, c, we come to do it upon every 
occurrence of the general event l, of which a, b and c are 
special cases” (5.297).
3
 Even the recognition of a friend 
would be based on some form of reasoning: we would 
not explicitly consider the premises of such an inference 
simply because it works and goes on without hindrances 
insofar as the hypothesis on which the inference is based 
is satisfied (5.223). 
To sum up, here Peirce tells us that perceptions and 
sensations (and clearly judgments) rest on inferential 
processes; not only that, but even affective sensibility, as 
well as habits of actions, are grounded in forms of 
reasoning that can be more or less incomplete. If seen in 
the light of these specific texts, Peirce’s position seems 
to be exposed to the risk of a reduction of human 
experience to cognition or to offer a basis for the thesis 
that cognition pervades every form of human experience 
– thirdness, to use Peirce’s later phenomenological 
categories, seems to reabsorb both firstness and 
secondness.  
Of course, this is a one-sided viewpoint on Peirce’s 
philosophy, whose steps were much more 
multidirectional from the mid-1980s onward 
(Maddalena 2015, 33). More substantially, it could also 
be claimed that Peirce’s development of his three 
phenomenological categories was a (more or less 
successful) attempt to defend the thesis that the origin 
of our knowledge lies in quality (Maddalena 2014: 107). 
Dewey probably recognized this issue in Peirce’s thought 
by stressing the value of Peirce’s theory of quality over 
his semiotics in an essay dating back to 1935 (Dewey, 
1998; on this see Innis 2014).  
                                                 
3 
It should be noted that whereas here Peirce provides a 
rather intellectual picture of habits, the picture he 
provides in other texts is somewhat different – the 
emphasis being not on a deliberate inference provoking 
the fixation of a habit, but on previous habits of action 
and belief as the basis for new habits. This different 
emphasis derived from the influence of Alexander Bain 
on classical pragmatists (see Feodorov 2017) and was 
systematically developed by John Dewey in Dewey 1983. 
Nonetheless, these early essays lay out the issue at 
stake very clearly – an issue that both Dewey and Peirce 
himself had to take seriously into account and possibly 
try to reconcile with the reasons of immediate 
experience. 
 
2. The Two Sides of Wittgenstein 
 
A transition to Wittgenstein seems to be rather 
consequential at this point of the inquiry, because there 
is a profound convergence between the anti-Cartesian 
spirit of Some Consequences of Four Incapacities and 
Wittgenstein’s later texts, as some scholars have noted 
(Hagberg 2016). One of the main polemical targets of 
the second part of the Philosophical Investigations is the 
idea that we first have an immediate and direct 
experience of the meaning of words, which we then use 
in different contexts (see Perissinotto 2002, Perissinotto 
2016 and Morelli in this issue). It is clear that Peirce and 
Wittgenstein converge in their criticism of the picture of 
a secluded mind and self-consciousness as an inward 
depository for private contents, which deserves primacy 
in terms of certainty and undoubted knowledge 
(Hagberg 2016: 36). In the last sections of his 
Philosophical Investigations (and similarly to Peirce and 
Dewey), Wittgenstein endorses an overturning of the 
traditional interpretation of this process: first we learn 
to do something and use words in appropriate contexts 
of shared practices, and only later on can we focus on 
words and their meanings as part of an interior 
discourse. This means that this interior voice should not 
be considered the first means of apprehension of 
meanings; on the contrary, it results from the 
transposition of previous interpersonal exchanges 
between individuals who share the same practices, 
language and form of life. It is only at this (belated) point 
that we have a direct and immediate experience of 
meanings, as we draw them out from our allegedly 
private mental depository – an erroneous notion, 
deriving from the isolation of a particular kind of solitary 
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game from already existing social and linguistic 
practices.  
It is exactly in relation to this issue that Wittgenstein 
makes a polemical reference to the Principles, more 
precisely to the chapter on the stream of thought, where 
William James characterizes consciousness as “absolute 
insularity” and says that the “most absolute fracture in 
nature” is the one dividing our own thoughts from those 
of others. By evoking James’s reference to the strange 
Erlebnis whereby a word is not yet present but seems to 
arise out of an inner experience (whether psychological 
or mental), Wittgenstein offers the famous response: 
 
The words ‘It’s on the tip of my tongue' are no 
more the expression of an experience than ‘Now 
I know to go on!’. We use them in certain 
situations, and they are surrounded by a 
behavior of a special kind, and also by some 
characteristic experiences. In particular, they are 
frequently followed by finding the word. (Ask 
yourself: “What would it be like if human beings 
never found the word that was on the tip of their 
tongue?). (Wittgenstein 1958: 219). 
 
Very briefly, there is no privileged psychological or 
mental access to meanings apart from the common 
contexts in which humans share their practices and 
linguistically interact with one another; there is no 
interior Erlebnis giving rise to or constituting the 
meaning of a word.
4
 
Hence, should we understand Wittgenstein’s 
contribution to our opening question as a complete 
denial of any kind of immediate or direct experience? I 
suspect that this is only one part of the story: 
Wittgenstein was criticizing a certain use (or abuse) of 
experience in philosophical discussions while, on the 
other hand, he was also wondering if there could be 
other ways to consider everyday direct experience from 
a philosophical point of view without over-
                                                 
4 
Although Wittgestein uses James here simply as a 
polemic target (as Goodman points out in Goodman 
2007: 142), the positive importance of the pragmatist’s 
work for Wittgenstein’s philosophy has been clearly 
recognized by many scholars (Boncompagni 2016 and 
Sanfelix Vidarte 2017).  
intellectualizing it. In my opinion, a first clue encouraging 
a more multifaceted reading of Wittgenstein on 
experience is given by his use of the word Erlebnis in this 
part of the Philosophical Investigations. Wittgenstein’s 
criticism is directed toward the alleged primacy of 
Erlebnis, understood as the direct experience of 
meanings as mental or psychological contents – 
differently, the term Erfahrung appears only at the 
beginning of paragraph XI, in the second part of the 
Philosophical Investigations. It is well known that 
German philosophy has made extensive use of the two 
German words for experience, Erlebnis, and Erfahrung, 
by assigning them different meanings and different roles 
in various philosophical systems. Hans-Georg Gadamer 
proposed a famous analysis of the philosophical 
meanings of the term “Erlebnis” in the first part of his 
Truth and Method (part I, B, ii and iii) – the 
reconstruction of the history of the word played a 
significant role in his criticism of “aesthetic culture”, 
namely a cultural form, based on the grounding 
assumption that the experience of art and the beautiful 
represented something completely different and 
separate from other ways of perceiving and experiencing 
the ordinary world.
5
 Very briefly, Gadamer points out 
some features in the complex philosophical history of 
the concept of Erlebnis, which are essentially the 
polemical target of Wittgenstein’s criticism. Gadamer 
emphasizes that a distinguishing feature of the 
                                                 
5 
Furthermore, Gadamer’s hermeneutical choice to 
distance himself from the phenomenological approach 
could be detected in this rejection of the concept of 
Erlebnis in favour of the idea of an Erfahrung of art as 
involving a real change in the subject having an 
experience. It has to do with a criticism of the alleged 
decisive primacy conferred by Husserl’s phenomenology 
on the noetic pole of the so-called intentional relation, 
to the detriment of the noematic pole. Roberta 
Lanfredini has highlighted a similar point at the 
beginning of William James’s essay Does Consciousness 
Exist?, where the author criticizes the strong asymmetry 
between the two poles of experience that emerged from 
Kant’s transcendental philosophy onward – and hence 
the position he himself had adopted in the Principles of 
Psychology (Lanfredini 2016). 
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philosophical concept of Erlebnis is the fact that it 
belongs to the inwardness of an individual conscience. 
This feature would guarantee a direct, unmediated 
access to its owner: the first person character of an 
Erlebnis would constitute the first unmediated and 
indisputable given, on which any other knowledge 
should be founded. Intimacy and adherence to one’s 
own inner life as well as certainty and immunity from 
doubt are the two main characteristics defining the 
concept of Erlebnis and lending it a philosophical 
primacy that is criticized and regarded as illegitimate 
both by Wittgenstein and by Gadamer. On the other 
hand, in his further treatment of art Gadamer recalls 
that the German philosophical tradition developed also 
the more inclusive concept of Erfarhung, which extends 
beyond the limitedness of inwardness, inner life, the 
individual conscience and the mind. Differently from 
Erlebnis, the term Erfarhung – at least in its 
philosophical, mainly Hegelian, dimension – tends to 
include everything that happens, involving human 
actions and passions, as well as the historical and 
cultural relations between the so-called experiential 
poles (CFR. Gadamer 1990, part II, 4, 3, B). 
This last point brings us back to Wittgenstein and to our 
thesis that he is inquiring whether there is still room to 
consider other modes of experience (Erfahrung) beyond 
introspection, mental or internal experience, and the like. 
Speaking about the experience (Erfarhrung) of “noticing an 
aspect”, he famously says that his inquiry is focused on the 
“grammar” of the concept, which is to say its use in a 
language (and not on the alleged psychological causes of a 
concept, i.e. a specific Erlebnis which should be investigated 
by psychologists, not philosophers). What has been largely 
overlooked, by contrast, is the fact that Wittgenstein also 
makes an explicit reference to a plurality of 
Erfahrungsbegriffe: “We are interested in the concept and 
its place among the concepts of experience” (Wittgenstein 
1958, 193).  
 
 
A second passage deserving consideration for our 
purposes is the beginning of the second part of the 
Philosophical Investigations, where Wittgenstein famously 
states: 
 
One can imagine an animal angry, frightened, 
unhappy, startled. But Hopeful? And why not? 
A dog believes his master is at the door. But can he 
also believe his master will come the day after 
tomorrow? – And what can he not do here? – How 
do I do it? – How am I supposed to answer this? 
Can only those hope who can talk? Only those 
who have mastered the use of a language. That is to 
say, the phenomena of hope are modes of this 
complicated form of life.  
(Wittgenstein 1958, 174) 
 
The passage seems to suggest that Wittgenstein was 
interested in understanding whether the fact that humans 
speak with one another – that our forms of life are strictly 
intertwined with exchanged words – has an influence on 
the ways they believe and hope, as well as fear certain 
things and feel pain or see something as a duck or a rabbit. 
In other words, I tend to read this passage as though 
Wittgenstein were posing the question of whether our 
being speaking creatures contributes to re-shaping the 
animal sensibility in which our roots are embedded. More 
specifically, it seems to me that Wittgenstein focused the 
problem whether our everyday seeing, feeling pain, 
shouting, believing or hoping should always be considered 
mediated experiences, always involving inferences and 
interpretations. Wittgenstein resists the idea that our 
ordinary seeing something as a specific thing is grounded on 
an inferential process. Differently, this can be the case when 
we shift from seeing something as a duck to seeing it as a 
rabbit: there could be a reason eliciting a change in my 
perceptual experience and a reasoning – the change is due 
to a non-artificial doubt (to use Peirce’s lexicon) or to 
hesitation about what I can and should do when a situation 
becomes indeterminate (to recall Dewey’s formulation of 
the issue).  
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This is also the case with exclamations and interjections, 
as well as with shouts and human cries. It is even the case 
with words themselves when they are perceived by the 
interlocutors as unmediated behaviors, similar to shouts.
6
 
Most of our seeing something as something as well 
as the functioning of certain words and sentences as 
bodily gestures works immediately because we are 
intimately familiar with a context and a linguistic game, 
we adhere to it by means of an attitude or a ‘belief’ that 
is more primitive than an epistemological assumption. 
According to Moyal-Sharrock, this kind of immediacy is 
connected to our belonging to a form of life that is 
deeply rooted in our animality, consequently preceding 
any epistemological doubt and any inferential process 
(Moyal-Sharrock 2016). 
Wittgenstein’s famous observations on following a 
rule (§§ 197-202) are largely consistent with this view: 
he states that “there is a way of grasping a rule which is 
not an interpretation (Deutung)” (Wittgenstein 1958, 
81). Wittgenstein refers to specific practices and to 
dispositions to act in a certain way, to habits of action 
and behavior that are not the result of the unconscious 
repetition of an originally intentional act. On the 
contrary, they are anchored in a shared form of living 
preceding any individual act as well as any singular word 
utterance (Dreon 2016). 
Considering cases of this kind, Luigi Perissinotto 
argues that such linguistic games should be considered 
extensions of more primitive behaviors. The word 
‘primitive’ in these cases has no reductive 
characterization, but simply refers to what is not the 
result of any reasoning. “From this point of view”, he 
says, “‘primitive’ is not so much a synonym of 
‘elemental’ or ‘simple’ as of ‘immediate’, where 
‘immediate’ means: non mediated by reasoning, 
                                                 
6 
Cf. also § IX (in Wittgenstein 1953), where Wittgenstein 
excludes that an expression such as “I am afraid” is the 
description of an interior state (an Erlebnis). However, 
he emphasizes that a word can be either very far from a 
shout or very close, since there are various degrees and 
nuances between the two extremes. 
calculation, inductive and analogical processes, and so 
on and so forth” (Perissinotto 2002, 107, my translation). 
It is in this sense, according to Wittgenstein’s 
perspective, that we can speak of immediate experience, 
once we have freed ourselves from the myth of 
introspection and the direct intuition of one’s own self. 
 
3. James’s claim for immediate experience 
 
Let’s return to the classical pragmatists and more 
precisely to the way William James poses the whole 
issue in his Essays in Radical Empiricism. I will focus my 
attention on some features of his text which Dewey 
found compelling and further developed in his own way. 
The influence of these essays on Dewey’s Experience and 
Nature is very strong but it is always filtered through 
Deweyan lenses. The first element I wish to emphasize is 
that James, as a radical empiricist, does not abandon his 
preference to consider ‘immediate experience’ an 
important issue but a crucial shift is made with respect 
to the Principles (see Bella in this volume). As has already 
been observed, in the chapter on the stream of thought 
immediateness and immunity from doubts are 
attributed to interior experience in its allegedly 
“absolute insularity”: “the personal self rather than the 
thought might be treated as the immediate datum in 
psychology” (James 1981: cap.IX, § 1).
7
 In Does 
Consciousness Exit?, as well as in A World of Pure 
Experience, it is no longer the strictly personal 
consciousness that is already given but the continuum of 
experience.
8
 Some remarks are important for a better 
                                                 
7 
Nonetheless, James’s Principles are marked by tensions 
and ambiguities also with regard to the issue of 
consciousness, as is interestingly acknowledged by 
Dewey in an essay dating back to 1940, whose eloquent 
title is The Vanishing Subject in the Psychology of James 
(Dewey 1988 b). 
8 
I owe to Kenneth Stikkers an interesting detail about 
Wilhelm Jerusalem, the Austrian scholar who translated 
James’s Pragmatism into German and worked on the 
project of founding epistemology and logic on social 
psychology. Jerusalem still suggested to use the German 
word “Erlebnis” (rather than “Erfahrung”) for 
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understanding of James’s shift from the stream of 
consciousness to the experiential continuum – without 
denying some problems in James’s theory of neutral 
monism that cannot be the object of this inquiry. 
Negatively, experience is no longer understood as a kind 
of interior dimension; on the contrary, it is everything 
which occurs without the need for an underlying 
foundation – “In radical empiricism there is no bedding; 
it is as the pieces clung together by their edges, the 
transitions experienced between them forming their 
cement” (see the “Conclusion” of A Word of Pure 
Experience).
9
 “There is no general stuff of which 
experience at large is made” (Does Consciousness Exist?, 
section V): experience is made of everything – stuff, 
nature, features – we experience and consequently it is 
genuinely pluralistic. It is the dynamic world, including 
human life, which is not perceived as an exclusive 
property belonging to a personal consciousness; on the 
contrary, it simply is what it is: namely, superabundant, 
chaotic, vague, without sharp edges dividing one part 
from another (see Gavin 1992). I suggest we could 
understand the term ‘radical’ that is attributed to 
empiricism to mean the rich and vague plurality of 
processes that do not need any reference to principles 
transcending them. James wanted to account for this 
immediate experience we adhere to before posing any 
philosophical question and any real or merely artificial 
doubt (see Colapietro in this volume). 
 
                                                                       
“experience” in James’s later works. In my opinion, this 
choice was connected to the strong influence of James’s 
Principles on his readers – the same influence that 
pushed Wittgenstein to consider James as the paradigm 
of a dogmatic conception of introspection. Kenneth 
Stikkers says that Jerusalem’s preference for “Erlebnis” 
was connected to his criticism of James with respect to 
the lack of the social dimension of experience in his 
thought (Stikkers 2009). 
9 
Lanfredini (2017) interprets this change in James’s 
thought in phenomenological terms, by arguing that 
with this new conception of experience James abandons 
any primacy previously attributed to the subjective (or 
noetic) pole of experience at the expenses of the 
objective (or noematic) pole. 
Of course, we could object that James’s insistence on 
pure experience as “plain unqualified actuality, a simple 
that, as yet undifferentiated into thing and thought, and 
only virtually classifiable as objective fact or as 
someone’s opinion about fact” (A World of Pure 
Experience, section V) is the late result of a sophisticated 
philosophical approach.
10
 Nonetheless, it must be 
acknowledged that James clearly does not refer to the 
dogmatic assumption of pure experience as a neutral 
given, assumed as the ground for cognition. On the 
contrary, James alludes to the continuum of dynamic 
processes – both organic and environmental – in which 
we are embedded before we can functionally establish 
whether something is either subjective or objective, 
whether it should be an attribute of things or thoughts, 
of physical reality or the mind. We practically adhere to 
this kind of continuum before specific cognitive relations 
take place between certain parts of experience and 
others. The immediacy of experience, in this broad and 
inclusive sense, is not at all a cognitive feature, because 
it is already there whenever it becomes necessary to 
distinguish a knower from the known, because a real 
doubt (not a paper one) arises from what Dewey will 
later describe as an indeterminate situation. 
As a matter of fact, this reshaping of the role and 
place of knowledge within experience will represent one 
of the strengths of Dewey’s approach to the issue – he 
will later make it much more explicit and develop all its 
consequences.  
 
 
 
                                                 
10 
Gavin (in Gavin 1992, 4) claims that James was deeply 
conscious of the impossibility of foregoing any 
theoretical disposition toward the object of philosophy, 
even when it consists in the allegedly “unarticulate” 
tissue of immediate experience: although theories and 
languages are structurally “directional”, they are “not 
dismissable”. His answer, according to Gavin, consisted 
in adopting a method of vigilance, while, at the same 
time, resisting the temptation to “clean up the vague” 
for epistemological reasons. 
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In my opinion, Dewey will also further develop 
another aspect foreshadowed in the Essays in Radical 
Empiricism in his 1925 volume, namely James’s 
reference to so-called “affectional facts”.  
James transformed one of the cruxes of modern 
philosophy into an argument in favor of his anti-dualistic 
conception of experience – his idea of integral and 
practical experience as prior to and exceeding dualistic 
distinctions, such as mind and world, subject and object 
and so on. In a nutshell, the traditional philosophical 
problem is whether appreciations of values – both 
aesthetic and ethical ones – should be considered 
subjective or objective. For example, what is painful? Are 
some objects painful or should the property be 
attributed to the experiences we have of them? Is a 
certain figure fascinating or are we projecting a quality 
of our Erlebnis onto the object at stake? Are morally 
valuable characteristics in res or in the subject who is 
experiencing them? Is beauty an attribute of the object 
(a work of art or a natural landscape) or is it located in 
the eyes of those who appreciate beauty?  
James takes advantage of the “chaotic”, “hybrid”, 
and “ambiguous” character of this class of experiences. 
According to James, the never-ending debate on the 
subjective or objective character of qualities shows that 
it is misleading and inconclusive to attempt to definitely 
regiment them by attributing them either to a res 
cogitans or to a res extensa, which is to say two modes 
of being (psychic and physical, mental and neural) which 
are supposed to be completely discontinuous. 
Alternatively, we can draw functional and contextual 
distinctions, for example, between a pain that is serious 
and in need to be nursed and a pain that is the result of 
hypochondria. Those distinctions are connected to the 
relations we assume as crucial from time to time at the 
expense of other relations we tend to overlook in the 
continuum of experience. In other words, the fact of 
characterizing something as either subjective or 
objective does not depend on the metaphysical stuff or 
nature out of which it is allegedly constituted. By means 
of a deflationary argument, James states that these 
distinctions between the various phases of an 
experience respond to our temporary needs and to an 
ever-changing context.  
Dewey will develop James’s idea that these affective 
qualities of experience (he will also speak of them as 
“esthetic”) exercise an effective role in our experiences, 
by conferring emphasis or enhancing them at the 
expenses of other features, as well as by making them 
more interesting – in more contemporary terms, we 
might say that these qualitative features in experience 
tend to draw salience lines and to control our orienting 
in the environment.  
In any case, this kind of emphasis, salience and the 
like hardly seems to be the last result of an inferential 
process; consequently, a serious tension seems to arise 
between the Peirce of Some Consequences of Four 
Incapacities Claimed for Man and James’s radical 
empiricism. Dewey was faced the difficult task of putting 
these two profound yet apparently opposite issues back 
together. On the one hand, he did so by recognizing the 
crucial role and the irreversible change produced in the 
very structures of human experience by the emergence 
of language and semiotic processes; on the other hand, 
by avoiding a kind of philosophical straining, namely the 
attribution of an inferential structure (if only a 
hypothetical and incomplete one) to each and every 
human interaction with the environment.  
  
4. Dewey’s ways out of a philosophical impasse 
 
John Dewey shared Peirce’s and (virtually) 
Wittgenstein’s profound criticism of immediate 
experience understood as the direct perception of one’s 
own mental contents (Dewey 2004: 8-9, 13). He was very 
far from assuming a conception of inwardness as a 
privileged kind of experience that is supposed to be 
given directly and primarily to the subject, who could 
have an unmediated access to it and consequently 
adhere to it as a locus of certainty immune to any doubt. 
Pragm at ism Tod ay Vo l .  9,  I ssu e 2 ,  2018 
IS  TH E R E  AN Y  RO O M  F O R  I M M E D I A T E  E X P E R I E N C E ?  LO O K I N G  F O R  A N  AN S W E R  I N  DE W E Y   
(A N D  W I T T G E N S T E I N )  V I A  P E I R C E  A N D  JA M E S  
R o b e r t a  D r e o n  
 
 
 68 
Dewey’s understanding of experience was very remote 
from the Erlebnis model – not only for theoretical 
reasons but also because of the socio-political 
consequences of the misuse of this concept in relation to 
everyday life, as is evident in Individualism Old and 
New.
11
 
On the contrary, Dewey had a very inclusive idea of 
experience, as something unfolding in the natural and 
human world and involving the complex of dynamic and 
historic processes that have to do with human actions in 
the real world. In Experience and Nature, Dewey 
famously stated that 
 
[…] experience is of as well as in nature. It is not 
experience that is experienced, but nature – 
stones, plants, animals, diseases, health, 
temperature, electricity, and so on. Things 
interacting in certain ways are experience; they 
are what is experienced. Linked in certain ways 
with another natural object – the human 
organism – they are how things are experienced 
as well. (Dewey 1981: 12-13). 
 
Dewey insistently highlights that human actions and 
sufferings are as real as natural events because they are 
natural events dynamically contributing to changing and 
shaping the environment to which they belong. As a 
consequence, this picture of experience has a strong 
sense of contingency to it, an awareness of a structural 
lack of clear and complete epistemic transparency, as 
well as an explicit assumption of the hypothetical, risky 
and provisional character of our truth claims – not 
because they are supposed to be merely subjective but 
because both the organic and environmental conditions 
for interaction are always shifting (see Calcaterra, 2011).  
Taking a step back, it is useful to focus on the 
connection between organic life and the environment, 
which constitutes the core of Dewey’s idea of 
                                                 
11 
On this issue see Calcaterra 2013, introducing the 
Italian translation of Dewey’s 1929 volume. On the 
“Pathology of Inwardness” see also Lothstein 1977. See 
Dreon 2015 on Dewey’s criticism of the political and 
economic consequences of an exclusive cultivation of 
one’s own inner life at the expense of real emancipation. 
experience. From his point of view, Darwin’s 
evolutionary biology offers some beneficial feedback on 
philosophical distortions because it definitely abandons 
the traditional modern assumption that human subjects 
are independent entities dealing with an already given 
and complete reality that exists per se. This assumption 
dissolves when considering some “biological 
commonplaces” (Dewey 1989: 20): all living beings, 
including humans, depend on an environment to survive, 
flourish and die; life goes on in and by means of an 
“environmental medium, not in a vacuum” (Dewey 1980: 
7). Furthermore, living beings belong to an environment 
on which they depend and with which they continuously 
interact. Consequently, they constantly contribute to 
changing their environment from within to a more or 
less wide extent.  
At the end of The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy, 
Dewey sums up the possible effects of Darwin’s 
evolutionary biology for developing a sounder 
philosophical conception of experience. First of all, “If 
biological development be accepted, the subject of 
experience is at least an animal, continuous with other 
organic forms in a process of more complex 
organization” (Dewey 1980: 26), because different forms 
of life stand out through the greater or lesser degree of 
complexity of their interactions with an environment. 
Moreover (and foreshadowing the more recent idea of 
neural reductionism), “experience is not identical with 
brain action; it is the entire organic agent-patient in all 
its interaction with the environment, natural and social. 
The brain is primarily an organ of a certain kind of 
behavior, not of knowing the world” (ibidem). Finally, 
“experience means primarily not knowledge, but ways of 
doing and suffering” (ibidem). 
To sum up, experience is constituted by the dynamic 
interactions between human organisms and their natural 
as well as naturally social environment.  
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This kind of approach to experience makes it 
possible to speak plausibly and non-dogmatically of 
immediate experience, by denying that there exist any 
forms of direct, non-inferential knowledge. 
By reading Dewey’s texts as though they were 
mainly aimed at solving the whole issue and by 
simplifying the complexity of his lines of thought, I 
suggest that his answer could be connected to three 
main arguments. (1) Dewey endorses a conception of 
experience as something including vital interactions that 
are not primarily or eminently cognitive relations, by at 
the same time downsizing the role of knowledge in 
experience. (2) Furthermore, he decisively emphasizes 
the aesthetic, qualitative or affective meanings of things, 
persons and situations in primary experience. (3) Finally, 
he adopts a non-foundational, circular conception of the 
relationship between reflective and eminently 
qualitative phases of experience, so that the results of 
previous reflective inquiries are absorbed by primarily 
qualitative experience and react on it, enriching its depth 
and complexity.
12
 
Let’s now consider these lines of thought more 
analytically.  
 
4.1. In Experience and Nature, there is room for 
immediate experience – Dewey seems to favor the 
formula “primary” experience over “immediate” 
experience, even though he does not stick to a fixed 
expression. In the first chapter of the 1925 volume, he 
claims that all forms of unreflective primary experience 
are unquestionable. If we read this statement through a 
Peircian lens, Dewey is supporting the idea that we 
cannot really suspend our belief in “gross, macroscopic, 
crude subject-matters in primary experience” (Dewey 
                                                 
12 
For a different point of view on the opportuneness of 
speaking about immediate experience, see Ryder 
(forthcoming). The core of Ryder’s argument is grounded 
in the development of Justus Buchler’s distinction 
between query and inquiry rather than in Dewey’s 
distinction between primary experience and reflective 
experience.  
1988: 15); if we did, this would be a clear case of a 
“paper doubt”, namely an artificial and derived doubt 
(see Colapietro in this volume). In Dewey’s language, it 
would be a philosophical fallacy, consisting in the 
assumption of the refined outcomes of a reflective 
inquiry as though they were the primary elemental 
features of experience.  
For Dewey, everything happening in the world – 
things and circumstances that hinder us or simply 
happen to us and have an impact on our lives – is not 
primary in the sense of representing the first neutral 
data on which knowledge is based. Rather, these 
elements are primary in the sense that they are already 
there, something which has already happened to us and 
has already conditioned our actions and behaviors 
before a specific cognitive problem arises and elicits a 
process of inquiry. In a formula, it is life that is primarily 
at stake in experience, rather than knowledge. By 
returning to Peirce and his phenomenological categories, 
we could translate Dewey’s distinction between primary, 
“consummatory” experience and more reflective phases 
of experience in terms of relations: primarily dyadic 
relations, which bear the impact – be it favorable or 
unfavorable – of something on our lives, are the more 
inclusive background in which triadic or symbolic 
references can be developed as further chances, 
whenever necessary. When something does not work in 
our largely habitual interactions with the environment, 
the opportunity for inference is opened up – but 
knowledge is a secondary or intermediate phase in the 
temporal development of experience, as Dewey 
emphasizes in his 1916 introduction to his Essays in 
Experimental Logic: 
 
But it is indispensable to note that […] the 
intellectual element is set in a context which is 
noncognitive and which holds within it in 
suspense a vast complex of other qualities and 
things that in the experience itself are objects of 
esteem or aversion, of decision, of use, of 
suffering, of endeavour and revolt, not 
knowledge (Dewey 2004). 
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This does not mean that knowledge enters into 
experience as an alien or transcendent feature. On the 
contrary, if all experience is of nature as well as in 
nature,  
 
[e]xperience thus reaches down into nature; it 
has depth. It also had breadth and to an 
indefinitely elastic extent. It stretches. That 
stretch constitutes inference (Dewey 1981:13).  
 
Inference is, for Dewey, “the use of what happens, to 
anticipate what will—or at least may—happen” and it 
“makes the difference between directed and undirected 
participation” (Dewey 1980: 16). It is the capacity to see 
something happening now as the sign of some possible 
consequences in the future, it is a more or less risky 
forecast – an abduction – of whether propitious or 
painful events might take place. It is an extremely 
powerful tool in human experience, decisively extending 
– “stretching” – its chances beyond those limits that are 
out of reach for non-human forms of life. Consequently, 
inference is an intrinsic feature in human experience,
13
 
yet it does not exhaust its qualitative complexity. 
Thought and reason are reflective modalities in 
experience which are elicited primarily by practical 
difficulties regarding human actions when we face the 
problem of what to do in new and unexpected 
circumstances. Reason in action is the process of 
returning to an indeterminate situation, by trying to 
analytically discriminate the vague, qualitatively thick 
features of primary experience – where we mostly move 
habitually, without any need for analysis. Inquiries are 
grounded in attempts to draw distinctions in the rich and 
largely continuous fabric of primary experience, by 
means of procedures that are functional to producing a 
                                                 
13 
See The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy, where 
Dewey says that experience “is full of inference” (Dewey 
1980: 6) in the sense that, if we abandon the atomistic 
point of view of classical empiricism, we cannot but 
acknowledge that connections and continuities are 
pervasive in our experiences. In this reasoning we can 
perceive Dewey’s capacity to put together Peirce’s and 
James’s different approaches by undoing their 
(sometimes) apparent contrasts. 
hypothesis, i.e. to making inferences – that are more or 
less complete and more or less risky, according to 
Peirce’s lesson – about further consequences.
14
 To sum 
up, this stretching of experience to meet needs 
stemming from experience itself is still an internal 
chance, although an impressive one. 
 
4.2. Dewey’s emphasis on the qualitative or aesthetic 
aspects of primary, unreflective experience represents a 
second important element for developing a non-
dogmatic conception of immediacy. Qualitative, 
aesthetic or affective features are not to be considered 
in eminently cognitive terms, as properties channeled 
through mere sensory perception, which would 
constitute the purely descriptive ground of subsequent 
cognitive processes (be they inferential or 
interpretative). On the contrary, Dewey wanted 
philosophy to acknowledge that in ordinary, everyday 
life, each time something happens to us, things, other 
persons and events are immediately felt as hostile or 
favorable, welcoming or detrimental, sweet or bitter, 
bearing hope or anxiety, as well as boring and 
indifferent. They are “immediately felt” not for any 
metaphysical reason, but simply because there is no 
native separation between an alleged merely sensory 
level of data and a subsequent affective quality which 
would be subjectively superimposed upon them. These 
two alleged levels can be abstracted and distinguished 
only later on for specific reasons and purposes when 
something goes wrong and a process of inquiry must be 
developed. Dewey uses the words felt or had, by 
contrast to known – and this is the reason why he speaks 
of aesthetic qualities or meanings by referring to a kind 
of affectively oriented sensibility, rather than to sense 
perception as a basic feature of an eminently cognitive 
                                                 
14 
In The Philosophy of Gestures, Maddalena emphasizes 
that analysis should be regarded as an intermediate 
phase between two synthetic moments in experience 
and, consequently, that discrimination should be 
considered an internal chance within a basic continuum 
(Maddalena 2015). 
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framework.
15
 Nonetheless, hostility and sympathy, 
bitterness and joy, hope and anxiety should not be 
considered “self-enclosed states of feeling, but [as] 
active attitudes of welcome and wariness” (Dewey 1980: 
10). They are not merely subjective qualities: on the 
contrary, they are real qualities characterizing real 
connections
16
 and interactions taking place between 
organisms and the environment. Moreover, qualitative 
experience is not primarily cognitive because it is 
connected to the biological and anthropological 
dimension of life, which is structurally exposed to an 
environment on which life depends at different levels of 
complexity and which, consequently, always has an 
impact and a basic (biological or existential, not 
cognitive) meaning for life itself. In these cases, 
references are direct, connecting life and its 
environment; they are not inferential because they 
basically assume the impact of an Umwelt on life – which 
deals primarily with existential connections and not with 
logical relations and triadic references, considering 
something that is not actually present as a sign for a 
possible consequence. From this perspective, Dewey 
could be seen to be re-using and re-interpreting Peirce’s 
phenomenological categories of Firstness and 
Secondness (see Dewey 1998) against the more one-
sided young Peirce, who may be regarded as considering 
                                                 
15 
This use of the word “esthetic” is basically consistent 
with James’s and Peirce’s approaches (see Shusterman 
2011, Maddalena 2014 and Innis 2014). Nonetheless, I 
think that Dewey developed and made more coherent a 
claim that was already to be found in the works of 
classical pragmatists. 
Marcuse draws an exemplary distinction of these 
two ways of understanding sensibility in the chapter on 
the aesthetic dimension in his book Eros and Civilization, 
by contrasting an epistemologically oriented conception 
of sensibility with an affective and embodied sensitivity, 
basically animated by desires and refusals – or longings 
and concerns, to speak in more Jamesian and Deweyan 
terms. 
16 
In Dewey 1980, the philosopher suggests that we 
distinguish between connections, which are existential, 
and relations, which can be understood as merely logical 
relationships. He probably introduced this distinction 
because he sought to avoid certain misunderstandings 
that could arise in reading James on “relations”.  
inferential processes pervasive in every form of 
experience.  
I suggest that Dewey expanded and radicalized the 
role of James’s so-called “affective facts” in experience 
(see also Shusterman 2011). First of all, things happen to 
us as pleasant or painful, hateful, tragic or joyful, they 
are nice or ugly, and we welcome or reject them: 
qualitative or aesthetic characterization is pervasive in 
human experience. At the same time, qualities are not 
merely descriptive properties, because they are laden 
with a sort of proto-evaluation that is not based on any 
inference but on the direct impact of a certain situation 
on one’s own life. In Art as Experience (Dewey 1989, 
Chap. XI), Dewey explains that aesthetic qualities (and, 
later on, artistic qualities) should not be interpreted as 
either subjective or objective properties, depending on 
the context and its specific purpose. Partially redirecting 
James’s interpretation of “affective facts”, Dewey says 
that aesthetic qualities concern the specific relations 
taking place between the various components or phases 
of an experience, which are just as real as the things and 
entities involved in an interaction, because they have 
consequences and affect the dynamic configuration of 
the environment. But Dewey is also very careful to avoid 
any hypostatization: qualities are not entities but modes 
of relation, they concern the ways in which interactions 
take place between human organisms and their natural 
as well as social and cultural environment.  
 
4.3. Nonetheless, the most important point in Dewey’s 
approach, in my opinion, is that his distinction between 
primary and reflective experience is not foundational – 
and probably it is for this reason that he avoids James’s 
use of the ambivalent adjective “pure” to characterize 
primarily qualitative experience. The distinction between 
qualitative experience and reflective inquiries cannot be 
a founding element because human beings are animals 
who, from the very beginning, find themselves caught in 
the middle of communicative and linguistic interactions 
as well as inferential processes, which belong to a 
Pragm at ism Tod ay Vo l .  9,  I ssu e 2 ,  2018 
IS  TH E R E  AN Y  RO O M  F O R  I M M E D I A T E  E X P E R I E N C E ?  LO O K I N G  F O R  A N  AN S W E R  I N  DE W E Y   
(A N D  W I T T G E N S T E I N )  V I A  P E I R C E  A N D  JA M E S  
R o b e r t a  D r e o n  
 
 
 72 
community more than they do to any individual speaker 
and knower. All of this interferes with and has 
consequences for qualitative experience, which 
incorporates the results of previous inquiries and is 
modified by them, whether it is enriched or 
impoverished. There is a kind of circular process which 
moves from qualitatively thick experience to analysis, 
hypothesis, and inference each time a difficulty arises 
about what can or should be done in a specific context. 
On the other hand, the outputs of reflective experiences 
cannot but return to the primary experience out of 
which the need for them emerged and through which 
their strength will be tested. Consequently, primary 
experience is continuously re-set and re-shaped, in some 
way or other: I correct my disposition to act if a 
particular mode of action works better than another in a 
new context of action. Primary experience checks the 
efficacy of the outputs of previous inquiries and 
appropriates them in largely unconscious ways when 
something unexpected and disrupting happens that 
requires a reassessment.  
From this point of view, the results of knowledge and 
inferences are everywhere in human experience, even in 
primarily qualitative and non-cognitive experiences of 
what ordinarily happens. However – as is clear from 
Dewey’s Rejoinder to some objections presented in the 
volume edited by Schlipp (Dewey 1939) – the American 
philosopher states that we should distinguish between 
knowledge understood as process in actu and the 
outputs of previous inquiries, which are absorbed and 
(collectively) established in primarily qualitative 
experience, and assumed as an integral part of the 
experiential fabric. Qualitative experience can be more 
or less vague, yet it is nonetheless appropriate when 
things unfold normally and there is no hindrance.  
At present in our culture, even the man on the street 
immediately sees the thick brush strokes of a Van Gogh’s 
painting as wheat in the hot summer fields of the 
Mediterranean, rather than as nervous splotches, 
without the need for any inferential process. Differently, 
a Deutung becomes crucial for the art expert who is 
expected to distinguish whether a painting is an 
authentic Van Gogh or a mere daub. Similarly, an 
uneducated elderly woman will say that she is suffering 
from gastritis, while her physician must investigate the 
causes of this and find possible remedies, if the old lady 
asks him for help when she can no longer endure her 
condition. 
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